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Itai Grinberg 
Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center 
 
ANONYMOUS WITHHOLDING AGREEMENTS AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION IN TAXING FOREIGN FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS 
 
Testimony before the Finance Committee of the German Bundestag 
24 September 2012 
 
Good afternoon, Chairwoman Reinemund and members of the Finance Committee.  
My name is Itai Grinberg, and I am an Associate Professor of Law at Georgetown 
University Law Center.1  Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today 
about the Swiss-German anonymous tax withholding agreement.  In my testimony, I 
will make three key points:   
• Automatic information exchange is superior to anonymous withholding 
for the purpose of combating tax evasion involving the use of foreign 
financial accounts.  
• German ratification of the Swiss-German anonymous tax withholding 
agreement would stifle the emergence of a multilateral automatic 
information exchange system.  As a result, Germany would be less able 
to address its own concerns with tax evasion through foreign accounts 
over the medium term.  By ratifying this agreement, Germany would 
also slow the development of a multilateral system that would allow 
many other countries around the world to effectively address their 
concerns with tax evasion through foreign accounts. 
• Switzerland has in effect agreed to automatic information exchange with 
the United States.  Germany could pressure Switzerland unilaterally, 
multilaterally, and through the EU for a similar agreement. 
I. The Future of the Taxation of Foreign Financial Accounts  
The international tax system is in the midst of a battle between automatic information 
reporting and anonymous withholding models for ensuring that nations can tax the 
foreign financial accounts2 of their residents.3  At stake is the extent of many countries’ 
capacity to impose an income tax on the investment income of individuals and the 
profits of closely held businesses in a world that is increasingly financially integrated.  
New approaches to enhanced cross-border tax cooperation based on automatic 
information exchange are currently being developed in three separate but related 
projects.  These projects are being led respectively by the Organisation for Economic 
                                                 
1 Until the summer of 2011, I served in the Office of International Tax Counsel at the United States Department of 
the Treasury.  In that capacity I was involved in the Obama Administration’s legislative, regulatory, and diplomatic 
efforts to address offshore tax evasion.  The views I express in this submission to the Finance Committee of the 
German Bundestag are solely my own.  
2 I use the term “foreign financial account” to refer to any account that is owned or controlled by an individual 
investor who is not tax resident in the jurisdiction where the financial institution (or the relevant subsidiary or branch 
of such institution) that provides the account is located.    
3 My views on the battle between automatic information reporting and anonymous withholding are laid out in much 
greater detail in two related papers.  The more recent of these papers is entitled The Battle Over Taxing Offshore 
Accounts (forthcoming in the UCLA Law Review; available at http://www.uclalawreview.org/?p=3814).  An earlier 
version of that paper, released in January 2012, is entitled Beyond FATCA: An Evolutionary Moment for the 
International Tax System, and is available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1996752. 
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Cooperation and Development (OECD), the EU, and the United States in partnership 
with some of its major European trading partners, including Germany.  Separately, 
Switzerland is promoting an anonymous withholding approach for addressing the 
question of foreign financial accounts.  Both the automatic information exchange 
approach and the anonymous withholding approach are built on the premise that 
financial institutions should act as cross-border tax intermediaries.  The debate around 
international tax cooperation has thus shifted from a dispute about whether financial 
institutions should function as cross-border tax intermediaries to a dispute about how 
financial institutions should perform that role and for which jurisdictions they should 
do so.  This development represents a remarkable shift in international norms.  
However, a great deal is at stake in the decision either to focus exclusively on the 
automatic information exchange practices being promoted by the OECD, the EU, and 
the United States and its partners, or to accept the anonymous withholding alternative 
that Switzerland is promoting. The triumph of the automatic information reporting 
model over the anonymous withholding model is important for several reasons: (1) it 
allows for the taxation of principal, (2) it helps maintain taxpayers’ sense of fairness, 
and (3) it makes possible the emergence of a multilateral system in which financial 
institutions serve as cross-border tax intermediaries regardless of the jurisdiction in 
which the financial institution is located.  
A. Automatic Information Exchange Is Superior to Anonymous 
Withholding 
An automatic information reporting model is superior to an anonymous withholding 
model in addressing the taxation of foreign financial accounts for three reasons: 
1. Automatic Information Exchange Can Reach Untaxed Principal 
Anonymous withholding is inferior because, unlike automatic information reporting, it 
cannot address concerns regarding the accumulation of untaxed principal in a foreign 
financial account.  Anonymous withholding is only triggered when interest, dividends, 
or capital gains are earned in a foreign account, whereas automatic information 
reporting can be structured to both report on income and gains and measure the growth 
of principal in a foreign account.  Untaxed principal—domestic business income that 
escapes taxation through the use of foreign financial accounts to engage in outright tax 
fraud—is just as great of a concern for tax administrators around the world as untaxed 
investment income in a foreign financial account.   
2. Automatic Information Exchange Helps Maintain a Sense of 
Fairness 
Cross-border anonymous withholding also may damage tax morale by institutionalizing 
different and preferential treatment for the most sophisticated taxpayers, as compared 
to the rest of society.  The more common foreign financial accounts become, the more 
the special treatment of anonymous account holders could undermine other taxpayers’ 
sense of fairness.  Furthermore, the Swiss-German anonymous withholding agreement 
is explicitly conditioned on German concessions to facilitate Swiss financial 
institutions’ access to German clients.  The concessions Switzerland extracted from 
Germany make it easier for Swiss institutions to legally compete with domestic 
German financial institutions without having any local footprint and without being 
subject to German regulation.  As a result, more wealthy Germans may shift toward 
Swiss asset management, and as more wealthy Germans avail themselves of Swiss 
anonymity, other taxpayers’ sense of fairness may well decline. 
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3. A Multilateral Solution Is Needed, and Multilateral Automatic 
Information Exchange Is Achievable 
Anonymous withholding by Switzerland alone is unlikely to substantially deter tax 
evasion by German taxpayers through the use of foreign accounts.  High-quality wealth 
management services are available in many jurisdictions.  Tax evaders can easily close 
Swiss accounts and open accounts in other jurisdictions to circumvent the Swiss-
German agreement.  Any comprehensive solution to this tax evasion problem must 
therefore involve many countries assisting Germany, and should therefore be 
multilateral.4   
As the OECD has recently documented, automatic information exchange is a growing 
practice, with many OECD countries sharing at least some information automatically in 
order to improve global tax administration.  Recent negotiations between the United 
States and other countries for automatic information reporting have also accelerated 
global discussions about multilateral automatic information exchange.  Most notably, 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States recently 
issued a model intergovernmental agreement to improve tax compliance based on 
reciprocal automatic information exchange.  The six countries also made a commitment 
to work together to achieve common reporting and due diligence standards for financial 
institutions in order to support a move to a more global system to combat tax evasion.  
As matters stand today, there is a substantial opportunity internationally to build a 
multilateral automatic information exchange system.   
B. Ratifying the Swiss-German Agreement Would Stifle the 
Emergence of a Multilateral Automatic Information Exchange 
System 
A comprehensive, multilateral automatic information exchange system is less likely to 
emerge if anonymous withholding is accepted as equivalent to automatic information 
exchange.  Bilateral anonymous withholding agreements are likely incompatible with a 
comprehensive multilateral automatic information exchange system. Consistent 
coercive pressure from the large, developed economies is needed to forge a working 
multilateral system.  Germany, and the EU as a whole, will find it much more difficult 
to pressure other jurisdictions to participate in automatic information exchange once 
Germany has agreed to anonymous withholding with Switzerland.  This difficulty 
arises both with respect to countries within the EU (such as Austria and Luxembourg) 
and countries outside the EU (such as Singapore and Hong Kong).  Thus, German 
ratification of the Swiss agreement would make it less likely for an effective regime 
that addresses the problem of tax evasion through the use of foreign accounts to take 
hold worldwide.  Consequently, Germany would be less able to address its own 
concerns regarding tax evasion through foreign accounts, and Germany would also 
make it less likely that other countries would be able to effectively address their 
problems with tax evasion through foreign accounts. 
1. Significance of the U.S. –Swiss Joint Statement Regarding FATCA 
In June, the United States and Switzerland issued a joint statement that represents a 
U.S. victory against Swiss bank secrecy.  The Swiss have, in essence, agreed to provide 
information automatically to the United States.  The mechanism is more cumbersome 
                                                 
4 The most comprehensive multilateral solution to address the taxation of foreign financial accounts would involve 
withholding that is not anonymous in combination with automatic information reporting.  A system that provides 
both withholding and reporting cross-border is, however, not currently under consideration internationally.   
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than the reciprocal automatic information exchange agreement currently on the table 
between Germany and the United States, but the end result is highly similar.  The U.S.–
Swiss Joint Statement generally envisions direct reporting by Swiss financial 
institutions to the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS).  Accounts of 
consenting U.S. accountholders would be reported to the IRS individually, while 
accounts of non-consenting U.S. accountholders would be reported on an aggregate 
basis.  Switzerland then agreed to accept and promptly honor group information 
exchange requests by the IRS for additional, individualized information about the non-
consenting U.S. account holders.  In the end, the U.S. receives the same information as 
it would have received under one-step automatic information exchange.   
Switzerland abandoned bank secrecy in its dealings with the United States in order to 
avoid the sanctions imposed by a new U.S. law (known as “FATCA”) that requires 
financial institutions to report on foreign accounts held by U.S. persons.  Germany is a 
major economy with which Switzerland has strong ties; Germany should also have the 
power to pressure Switzerland bilaterally for an arrangement that is similar to the 
information reporting negotiated by the United States. Germany could also push for 
coordinated defensive measures to build a multilateral automatic information exchange 
system at the G-20 or lead an EU-level process to pressure Switzerland to provide 
automatic information exchange to the EU.   
2. Consequences of German Ratification of the Anonymous 
Withholding Agreement 
If Germany (and the UK) instead ratify their anonymous withholding agreements with 
Switzerland, the international impact of the U.S.–Swiss agreement will be diminished. 
Switzerland will have successfully defused U.S. pressure to engage in automatic 
information exchange, while being able to claim that the U.S. agreement represents a 
special case.  If Germany ratifies its agreement with the Swiss, it will free Switzerland 
to promote anonymous withholding with those few other countries that have some 
leverage over the Swiss financial center and reject enhanced tax cooperation with 
everyone else.  This dynamic may explain why the Swiss insisted that, as part of the 
Swiss-German agreement, Germany commit to not work against anonymous 
withholding in dealings with third parties.5  If governments that are committing to 
increased automatic information exchange cannot coordinate with Germany to pressure 
Switzerland and other asset management jurisdictions to adopt a multilateral automatic 
information exchange system, then it will become difficult for the international 
community to effectively pressure Switzerland and other asset management 
jurisdictions to move towards a multilateral system.  The absence of consistent, 
coordinated pressure in one direction would harm both German tax administration and 
other governments that are concerned about the global problem of tax evasion 
involving the use of foreign accounts.  
 
Madame Chairwoman and members of the Finance Committee, thank you again for 
inviting me to participate in this hearing.  
                                                 
5 See the Joint Declaration Concerning the Equivalence of this Agreement (Gemeinsame Erklärung der 
Vertragstaaten zur Gleichgewichtigkeit des Abkommens). 
